以下步骤是 Polkadot 网络中的治理过程:
set_code，它可以切换 runtime 的整个代码，从而实现不需要“硬分叉”的功能）。 它们是分离事件，具有固定的投票发生时间段，然后被计票，如果投票获得批准，则会进行函数调用。
所有公投均具有颁布延迟(enactment delay)。这是全民投票结束并且假设提案获得通过，将会实施的改变。对于发起公投的头两种方式，这是固定时间(Kusama 会是 7天, 而 Polkadot 则会是 28天)。对于第三种类型，可以根据其需要设置。
任何人都可以通过在一定时期(区块) 内存放最少数量的DOT来进行提交方案。 如果有人同意该建议，他们可以存入相同数量的代币以支持该方案。 支持数量最多的提案将被选为全民投票。 提案完成后，绑定的代币将被释放。
议会(一致赞成) - 议会的所有成员都同意一项提案时，可以将其移交给全民投票。这个公投带有 negative turnout bias (意思是当愈少人参与投票，通过所需要的数量会愈少) - 查看下面 "Adaptive Quorum Biasing"。
议会(大部分赞成) - 仅需获得多数议会成员的同意即可。(1. Aye投赞成票多过Nay投反对票=接受，2. Nay多过Aye=反对。)
投票时，选民必须在全民投票结束后的至少颁布延迟期内锁定其令牌。 这是为了确保需要最低限度的经济买入并阻止投票。 同时，仅持有少量的DOT代币并不意味着它们不会影响公投结果，您可以阅读有关自愿锁定的更多信息。
例子: Peter: 投 `No` 有10 DOTs，锁12周 => 10 * 6 = 60 票数 Logan: 投 `Yes` 有 20 DOTs 锁2周 => 20 * 1 = 20 票数 Kevin: 投 `Yes` 有 15 DOTs 锁4周 => 15 * 2 = 30 票数
|大众||Positive Turnout Bias|
|议会(一致赞成)||Negative Turnout Bias|
Super-Majority Approve公式。 没有严格的法定人数，但是随着投票率的降低，所需投赞成票的数量也会增加。
approve - 赞成票数 against - 反对票数 voters - 总投票代币数 electorate -网络中 DOT 的总数
positive turnout bias, whereby a heavy super-majority of aye votes is required to carry at low turnouts, but as turnout increases towards 100%, it becomes a simple-majority-carriers as below.
negative turnout bias, whereby a heavy super-majority of nay votes is required to reject at low turnouts, but as turnout increases towards 100%, it becomes a simple-majority-carriers as below.
Majority-carries, a simple comparison of votes, if there are more aye votes than nay, then the proposal is carried.
To know more about where these above formulas come from, please read the democracy pallet.
例子: 假设我们总共只有1,500个DOT代币。 John - 500 DOTs Peter - 100 DOTs Lilly - 150 DOTs JJ - 150 DOTs Ken - 600 DOTs John: 投 `Yes`锁定2周 => 500 * 1 = 500 票数 Peter: 投 `Yes`锁定2周 => 100 * 1 = 100 票数 JJ: 投 `No` 锁定6周 => 150 * 3 = 450 票数 approve = 600 against = 450 voters = 1050 electorate = 1500
Based on the above result, the proposal will be approved. In addition, only the winning voter's tokens are locked, which means if that referendum hurts the network, then those who voted against it can immediately get their locked tokens back. They can exit the network and sell their tokens to the market before the proposal becomes effective. Moreover, winning proposals are autonomously enacted only after some cool-down period.
Polkadot utilizes an idea called
Voluntary Locking that allows token holders to increase their voting power by declaring how long they are willing to lock-up their DOTs, hence, the maximum number of votes for each token holder will be calculated by the following formula:
票数 = 代币 * 时间
Based on the current testnet setting, the maximum number of lock periods is set to 6.
Each period takes 2 weeks, which means the longest lock period would be 12 weeks.
Adaptive Quorum Biasing
Polkadot introduces a concept "Adaptive Quorum Biasing", which functions as a lever that the council can use to alter the effective super-majority required to make it easier or more difficult for a proposal to pass in the case that there is no clear majority of voting power backing it or against it.
Let's use the above image as an example.
If there is publicly submitted referenda only has 25% turnout, the tally of "aye" votes has to reach 66% for it to pass since we applied the
Positive Turnout Bias.
In contrast, when it has 75% turnout, the tally of "aye" votes has to reach 54%, which means that as more token holders vote on referenda, then the super-majority required decreases as the turnout increases.
When the council proposes a new proposal through unanimous consent, the referendum would be put to a vote using "Negative Turnout Bias." In this case it is easier to pass this proposal with low turn-out and requires a super-majority to reject. As more token holders participate in voting the bias approaches a plain majority carries.
Referring to the above image, when the referenda only has 25% turnout, the tally of "aye" votes has to reach 34% for it to accept.
In short, when turnout rate is low, a super-majority is required to reject the proposal, which means a lower threshold of "aye" (yes) votes have to be reached, but as turnout increases towards 100%, it becomes a simple-majority.
All three tallying mechanisms - majority carries, super-majority approve, and super-majority against - equate to a simple majority carries system at 100% turnout.
To represent passive stakeholders, we introduce the idea of a "council". The council is an on-chain entity comprising a number of actors each represented as an on-chain account. For Polkadot this number is likely to begin at around six people, and increase over the course of 9 months to 24 people (roughly one extra individual coming on every two weeks). In general it has a fixed number of seats (envisioned to be 24 for Polkadot) and all members have a fixed term (12 months).
The council is called upon primarily for two tasks of governance: proposing sensible referenda, and cancelling uncontroversially dangerous or malicious referenda.
For a referendum to be proposed by the council, a strict majority of members must be in favor, with no member exercising a veto. Vetoes may be exercised only once by a member for any single proposal; if, after a cool-down period, the proposal is resubmitted, they may not veto it a second time. In the case that all members vote in favor, the vote is considered unanimous and is treated as uncontroversial.
For a referendum to be cancelled, there must be a unanimous vote to do so. Since unanimity is a high requirement, it is expected that this measure will only be used when it is an entirely uncontroversial move. This may function as a last-resort if there is an issue found late in the day with a referendum's proposal such as a bug in the code of the runtime that the proposal would institute.
If the cancellation is controversial enough that there is at least one dissenter, then it will be left to the stakeholders en masse to determine the fate of the proposal.
At genesis, there will be 6 to 12 seats in the Council. All stakeholders are free to signal their approval of any of the registered candidates. For every two weeks, one of those seats is up for election and increase over the course of 9 months to 24 people (roughly one extra individual coming on every two weeks). All members have a fixed term (1 year). Council members can be removed early only by a referendum.
To elect a new council member, Polkadot employs
approval voting method to allow token holders that choose a list of candidates they want to support in equal weight and the one with the most approval votes wins the election, while top-N runners-up remain on the candidates' list for next election.
As opposed to a "first past the post", where voters must decide only on a single candidate chosen from a list, approval voting is a more expressive way to indicate voters' views. Token holders can treat it as Boolean voting to support as many candidates as they want.
Let's take a look at the example below.
The above example shows that candidate C wins the election in round 1, while candidate A, B, D & E keep remaining on the candidates' list for the next round.
For the top-N (say 4 in this example) runners-up, they can remain and their votes persist until the next election. After round 2, even though candidates A & B get the same number of votes in this round, candidate A gets elected because after adding the older unused approvals, it is higher than B.
This would be the tentative governance configuration for Polkadot in the initial genesis. It will be changed if any security loopholes have been found after third-party auditing.
The Technical Committee was introduced in the Kusama rollout and governance post as one of the three chambers of Kusama governance (along with the Council and the Referendum chamber). The Technical Committee is composed of the teams that have successfully implemented or specified either Polkadot/Kusama runtime or the runtime environment. Teams are added or removed from the Technical Committee from a simple majority vote of the council.
The Technical Committee can, along with the Polkadot Council, produce emergency referenda, which are fast-tracked for voting and implementation. These emergency referenda are intended for use only under urgent circumstances.